Determining Illegal Expropriation of IP-related Investment in ISDS

AuthorRuisi Peng
PositionPh.D. candidate in KoGuan School of Law at Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Pages51-73
Determining Illegal Expropriation of IP-related
Investment in ISDS
Ruisi Peng1
Abstract: Most countries have concluded bilateral investment treaties and free
trade agreements containing investment chapters. In these bilateral investment treaties
and free trade agreements, intellectual property is regarded as a type of investment.
Many bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements explicitly contains the
item of “intellectual property”. While some others only define “intangible property”
as one type of investment with tacitly approving intellectual property laid in the scope
of “intangible property”. Thus IP-related rules are playing an important role in
bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements, which make host countries
protecting IP-related investment from being expropriated. In cases of Philip Morris v.
Uruguay and Eli Lily v. Canada, intellectual property investors had recourse to
Investor-State Dispute Settlement arbitration on the basis of investment-related rules
in bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements. The controversial issues in
such two cases are whether host countries taking IP-related regulatory measures
concerning tobacco control legislation (in Philip Morris v. Uruguay) and patent
granted standards (in Eli Lily v. Canada) violated expropriation clauses that
prohibiting illegal expropriation in bilateral investment treaties and free trade
agreements. Investment arbitration tribunals dismissed investors’ allegations and
rendered awards to the effect that host countries’ these measures were not illegal
expropriation. However, investment arbitration tribunals did not clearly weigh
economic benefits in IP-related investment against public health interests in enforcing
IP-related measures. For the balance that giving considerations to economic benefits
in IP-related investment and public health interests, more balanced legal approaches
can be taken. For instance, the Agreement for the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership tried to strike a balance between host countries and foreign investors.
Such rules should be consciously strengthened in further conclusion of treaties.
Key Words: Investor-State Dispute Settlement; IP-related Investment; Illegal
Expropriation; the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership; the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
1. Introduction
In the bilateral investment treaty (hereinafter referred to as BIT) between the
Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan, which was signed in 1959, there defined
patents including techniques and inventions as one type of investment.2It is the era of
knowledge-based economy, which has resulted in a more and more important role of
knowledge-based investment on international economic cooperation, and
competitions on the development of proprietary intellectual property (hereinafter
referred to as IP) rights are increasingly fierce among countries as well as
transnational corporations.3
1Ruisi Peng, Ph.D. candidate in KoGuan School of Law at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
2See Article 1 of Germany-Pakistan BIT, https://investmentpolicy.uncta d.org/international-invest me
nt-agreements/treaties/bit/1732/germany---pakistan-bit-19 59- (accessed on December 25, 2021).
3See Amir Ullah Khan &Aarti Bharadwaj, Protecting I ntellectual Property Rights and Promo ting
44
In this context, many international investment agreements have stipulated those
intangible properties are an investment under the definition clauses, which explicitly
contains the item of “IP”. While some other agreements just only define “intangible
property” as one type of investment, but they tacitly approve IP laying in the scope of
“intangible property”. In this sense, it has reached the consensus that IP belongs to the
“investment” mentioned in international investment agreements, where IP has been an
object of investment protection articles.
Carlos M. Correa and Jorge E. Viñuales have indicated that the “IP”,4which is
usually defined as an “investment” in international investment agreements, was
required to embody the inner characteristics of investment liberalization and
investment promotion. In other words, the definition of “IP” as an investment is not
just to follow the existing requirements in TRIPS and IP chapters of free trade
agreements (hereinafter referred to as FTAs) without change. In this regard, “IP” as an
investment must be qualified for the existing IP rights in accordance with domestic
laws of host countries,5and be equipped with attributes of “investment” conforming
to the relevant rules in international investment agreements,6as well as the business
circumstances of IP-related investment in host countries.7Susy Frankel discussed the
investor-state dispute settlement (hereinafter referred to as ISDS) investment
arbitration tribunals’ position on determinations of IP-related investment disputes,8in
the light of teleological interpretation of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
1969 as well as the trend where a broader interpretation towards “investment” of BITs
and FTAs led by ISDS arbitration tribunals. Thus, such articles above have showed
out the actual eligibility of IP being an investment both in international investment
agreements and ISDS practice.
According to the paper of case study issued by International Centre for Trade and
Sustainable Development,9one growing trend in IP-related investment protection of
1990s was illustrated and expected to continue, in which international investment
agreements (mainly in forms of BITs and FTAs) are tending to introduce host
countries’ TRIPS/TRIPS-plus obligations into investment protection obligations
through adding the TRIPS/TRIPS-plus rules into the expropriation clauses of BITs
and FTAs. Furthermore, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development has made the summary of IP-related investment articles in the BITs and
Economic Growth: Is it Really a Chicken and Egg Story, 3(1) Review of Market Integration 69, 69-70
(2011).
4See Carlos M. Correa & Jorge E. Viñuales, Intelle ctual Property Rights as Protected Investmen ts:
How Open are the Gates?, 19(1) Jo urnal of International Economic Law 91, 91-120 (2016).
5See Dany Khayat &William Ahern, Reliance on Investmen t Treaty Standards to Claim for Failures
to Recognize or Protect Intellectual Property Rights, 3(2) BCDR International Arbitr ation Review 399,
406-9 (2016).
6See Siegfried Fina & Gabriel M. Lentner, The European Un ion’s New Generation of International
Investment Agreements and Its Implicatio ns for the Protection of Intellectual P roperty Rights, 18(1)
Journal of World Investment &Trade 271, 284-5 (2017).
7See Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Inve stment”? Eli Lily v. Canada an d the International
Intellectual Property System, 35(4) University of P ennsylvania Journal of International Law 1121,
1126-7 (2014).
8See Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectu al Property
Law, 19(1) Journal of International Economic Law 121, 121-43 (2016).
9See Pedro Roffe & David Vivas et al. , Maintaining Policy Space for Developmen t: A Case Study on
IP Technical Assistance in FTAs, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Developme nt Series Issue Paper No.19, pp.1-15 (2007).
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