Dispute resolution mechanisms of ppp agreements in China: a research based on judicial decisions

AuthorDispute resolution mechanisms of ppp agreements in China: a research based on judicial decisions
Pages360-386
FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA
VOL. 14 SEPTEMBER 2019 NO. 3
DOI 10.3868/s050-008-019-0018-6
FOCUS
RETHINKING PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS OF PPP AGREEMENTS IN CHINA:
A RESEARCH BASED ON JUDICIAL DECISIONS
YU Wenguang
Abstract Based on research on a number of judicial decisions regarding
concession and Public–Private Partnership (PPP) agreements, this paper
demonstrates the problems and dilemmas of China’s current PPP dispute resolution
mechanism and clarifies three fundamental issues: concessionPPP; concession
agreement administrative agreement; and disputes related to administrative
agreementsadministrative disputes. On the grounds of these conclusions, the
paper argues that the logical chain of China’s existing PPP and concession dispute
resolution mechanism is untenable. The logic of the current mechanism starts from
the definition of an administrative agreement; it then classifies concession
agreement as administrative agreement; and finally subjects the disputes over
concession agreements to administrative litigation. Yet, this starting point is
problematic because the definition of administrative agreement and the distinction
between public and private law attributes are difficult to determine precisely, as they
lack the necessary theoretical clarity and uniqueness. Overall, the current legal
situation of PPP in China is far from being satisfactory because a statutory law on
PPP is absent, the existing laws and regulations on administrative agreements are
primitive, and the judicial practice has not yet established unified and clear criteria.
Against this backdrop, this paper proposes a possible way out. First, we should
critically reflect on the current administrative agreement and PPP agreement theory.
Then, we should apply the method of legal fact research, adopt doctrinal tools of the
legal relationship theory and contract construction theory, and eventually establish a
multiple dispute resolution mechanism to resolve disputes effectively.
Keywords publicprivate partnerships, PPPs, concession agreements, administrative
agreement, dispute resolution mechanism, legal relationship theory
(喻文光) Dr. jur., Faculty of Law, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany; Associate
Professor, School of Law, Renmin University of China; Researcher, Law and Technology Institute, Renmin
University of China, Beijing 100872, China. Contact: yu_wenguang@hotmail.com
This work was supported by the funding research project of Renmin University of China (Project No.:
17XNA001).
2019] DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS OF PPP AGREEMENTS IN CHINA 361
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 361
I. CURRENT STATUS OF AND DEBATES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS OF
CONCESSION AND PPP IN EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS............................... 363
II. CONTROVERSIES OVER DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS OF CONCESSION AND
PPP IN JUDICIAL PRACTICE .................................................................................... 366
A. The Legal Nature of and the Jurisdiction over Concession Agreements........... 367
B. Difficulties in Identifying the Element of “Exercise of Administrative Power” in
Concession Agreements and Predicament of the Dual Dispute Resolution
Mechanism........................................................................................................ 370
1. Disputes over Non-Performance of Contractual Obligations by the
Government under Government Investment Promotion Agreements............371
2. The Legal Nature of the Government’s Temporary Takeover of Concession
Projects.......................................................................................................... 372
3. Disputes over the Nature of the Government’s Unilateral Termination of the
Agreement..................................................................................................... 373
C. Nonidentity between Disputes Related to Administrative Agreement and
Administrative Disputes.................................................................................... 376
III. RECONSTRUCTION OF PPP AND CONCESSION AGREEMENT THEORIES ................. 378
A. Exploring the Real Problems and Empirical Rules in the Practice of PPP and
Administrative Agreements in China Using the Legal Fact Research
Method.............................................................................................................. 378
B. Giving up the Logical Obsession of Referring to the Remedy of Administrative
Litigation Based on the Definition and Attributes of the Agreement................ 380
C. Reconstructing the Administrative Agreement and PPP Agreement Theory with
the Legal Relationship Theory and the Contract Construction Theory............ 383
D. Establishing a Multiple PPP Dispute Resolution Mechanism for the Purpose of
Resolving Disputes Effectively.......................................................................... 384
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 385
INTRODUCTION
Public–Private Partnership (PPP), a new innovative form of public administration and
public goods supply after privatization, deregulation, and reregulation, has been spreading
around the world since the 1990s. Starting from the 1984 Shajiao B Power Station BOT
Project in Shenzhen, PPP has been operational in China for more than 30 years, during
which it has experienced several up and downs. Since 2014, due to the supportive policy
from the central government, especially from the National Development and Reform
Commission and the Ministry of Finance, PPP has once again drawn great attention,

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT