Fundamental rights in the digital era, horizontal effect and the distinction between 'state' and 'society' in German and European Constitutional theory

• Author: Daniel Wolff
• Pages: 131-145

FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA

VOL. 13 SEPTEMBER 2018 NO. 3

DOI 10.3868/s050-007-018-0033-1

SPECIAL ISSUE

PARADIGMS OF INTERNET REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ERA, HORIZONTAL EFFECT AND THE

DISTINCTION BETWEEN “STATE ” AND “SOCIETY” IN GERMAN AND EUROPEAN

CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Daniel Wolff ∗

Abstract The article discusses the proposal for a “Charter of Digital Fundamental

Rights of the European Union,” whose central element is a binding effect of its

fundamental rights not only to state authorities, but also to powerful private internet

companies, which have a potential similar to that of the state to infringe on fundamental

rights in the digital era. The article outlines the traditional German approach to

fundamental rights and its underlying distinction between state and society, which

makes it difficult for German scholars to handle a so-called horizontal effect of

fundamental rights. Finally, the article discusses the main objections to such a horizontal

effect and shows some practical problems it has the potential to cause in German and

European constitutional law.

Keywords fundamental rights, horizontal effect, distinction between state and society

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 442

I. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED, THE AIM OF THE INITIATORS AND THE CENTRAL

INSTRUMENT TO ACHIEVE IT................................................................................... 444

II. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN GERMANY:

DOCTRINE AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................... 445

A. The Classical Liberal Conception of Fundamental Rights, the Debate on

Horizontal Effect and the Duty to Protect.......................................................... 445

B. The Doctrinal Reasons against Direct Horizontal Effect of Fundamental

Rights................................................................................................................ 447

C. The Underlying Distinction between State and Society.....................................448

III. QUESTIONING THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH: UNJUSTIFIED OBJECTIONS TO AND

∗ Daniel Wolff, Ass. Jur. and Ph.D. candidate, Faculty of Law, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany;

Research and Teaching Associate (Akademischer Rat a.Z.), Faculty of Law, LMU Munich, Munich 80539,

Germany. Contact: daniel.wolff@jura.uni-muenchen.de