Legal Enforcement and Trust Mechanism in Rumor Governance of Public Crisis

• Author: Hongjie Chen & Ge Ou
• Position: Associate Professor, Law School of Nanjing University/Master candidate in College of Philosophy, Law & Political Science, Shanghai Normal University
• Pages: 73-90

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Legal Enforcement and Trust Mechanism in Rumor

Governance of Public Crisis

Hongjie Chen & Ge Ou1

Abstract: In the unofficial social information network, people often continuously

deliver “hearsay” to their secondary audiences because they believe in the relationship

through which they obtain information. Conversely, people are actively involved in

transmitting versions of information that differ from those released by official

authorities because “people distrust or question information published by the

government, and then make up for the information ‘vacuum’ and psychological

imbalance created by distrust of the government by listening and spreading rumors”. In

this regard, people do not really believe in the so-called “hearsay”, but are actively

expressing distrust of the government. If the government cannot earn the trust of the

public, falsehoods about the situations such as epidemic and rumors of a public crisis

can overflow in social networks linked by interpersonal ties. Thus, the key to the

governance of rumors lies in the reconstruction of social trust structure, rather than the

punishment of the general public who spread unverified information with the

indiscriminate exercise of power “in the name of the law”. Such punishment can only

result in people’s fear of the government, rather than trust in the government.

Key words: Information Control; Freedom of Speech; Constitutional Rights;

Power and the Rule of Law; Social Trust

1. Logic of Government Governance of Rumors in the Epidemic

When confronted with the risk of infectious diseases outbreak, ordinary people

with a certain sense of social responsibility will take it for granted that timely

transmission of early warning information will help others to better take various

preventive measures and emergency plans to avoid various social crises induced by the

spread of the epidemic.2 However, the government which is responsible for public crisis

managements tends to attach more attention to economic growth and social order.3 For

example, local governments in Chinese Mainland consider economic growth and socio-

political stability, which ensures economic growth, as core policy objectives.4 In the

event of public issues such as infectious diseases, the government’s instinct is

1 The first author: Hongjie Chen, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Law School of Nanjing University; the

second author: Ge Ou, Master candidate in College of Philosophy, Law & Political Science, Shanghai

Normal University. This paper is support by Chinese National Social Science Foundation Project named

“Research on Theory and Practice of Significant Reform Based on Law” (NO.18AFX001).

2 See Lan Xue & Qiang Zhang, SARS and the Construction of China’s Crisis Management System,

18(4) Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 1, 1-6 (2003).

3 See Yefei Hu, Information Disclosure of Chinese Government from Three Major Public Crises,

23(12) Shandong Social Sciences 155, 157 (2009).

4 The performance of the economic take-off during the reform and opening-up period and the

tremendous improvement in people’s living standards have also led the ruling party to follow the

established trajectory and rebuild its legal foundation through the “miracle” of economic development.

See Xueguang Zhou, The Institutional Logic of Governance in China: An Organizational Approach,

SDX Joint Publishing Company, p.82 (2017).

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desalination measures aiming at not affecting economic growth, tourism and business

activities.5 It is on the basis of this policy logic that, the People’s Government of

Guangzhou Municipality, in spite of the risk of severe acute respiratory syndrome

coronavirus (hereinafter referred to as SARS) outbreak and the rule of the spread of the

epidemic, sticked to hosting the 2003 China Import and Export Fair Canton Fair.6

In order to prevent social panic from interfering with the implementation of the

government’s decision-making objectives, the government has strong incentive to

control information regarding breaking through the resistance of the media and trying

to report the outbreak publicly as a “mess”,7 and then show the arrogance of abusing

power. On February 11, 2003, at a press conference broadcast by the People’s

Government of Guangzhou Municipality, a reporter asked director of Guangzhou

Municipal Health Commission, “Is it true that atypical pneumonia is caused by avian

influenza virus?” And the subconscious reaction of the secretary was, “You should be

responsible for this sentence.”8

Of course, it doesn’t mean that the government is irresponsible, but rather reflects

that the government has its own management logic in the case of public crisis, which is

commonly referred to as “internal tightness and external looseness”. On one hand, it

tends to issue instructions only within the government system when problems appear,

and take self-considered effective prevention and control measures in an orderly way;9

on the other hand, the government considers there is certain information which ordinary

people do not need to know, and it will make information control a “live in peace”

picture. 10 For example, in the SARS outbreak, when Beijing had evolved from

“imported cases” to “primary cases”, Xuenong Meng, mayor of Beijing at the time, was

still very optimistic: “For Beijing, a population of more than 13 million people, 22 cases

are not a large proportion and all have been effectively controlled. There is no need to

worry at all.” Wenkang Zhang, minister of National Health Commission of the People’s

Republic of China in that period, was also very confident in his commitment, “Working,

living and traveling in China are safe.” and “It’s safe to wear a mask or not.”11 However,

as soon as Wenkang Zhang said, the World Health Organization listed Beijing as an

affected area on April 6, 2003. But Chinese Mainland’s media did not follow up in

time.12

5 See Shoulong Mao, The SARS Incident and Governance Reform, 19(9) South Reviews 36, 38 (2003).

6 See Guoqing Zhang, Public Crisis Management and Government Responsibility: Taking SARS

Epidemic Management as an Example, 19(12) Management World 42, 50 (2003).

7 In the traditional social speech system, the information from the bottom to the top is very scarce,

which is often suppressed as improper speech. See Ping Jin, Rumor: Rethinking its Definition and the

Enlightenment to Modern Society, 26(1) Journal of North University of China (Social Science Edition)

22, 26 (2010).

8 See Lidan Chen, People’s Right to Know and Social Stability: From the Information Disclosure of the

SARS Epidemic, 20(7) News Research 16, 17 (2003).

9 See Fangye Yu, “Tight Inside and Loose Outside” is the Root of the Spread of Fuyang City Epidemic,

https://comment.dbw.cn/system/2008/04/29/051237228.shtml (accessed on February 8, 2020).

10 In the early stage of the crisis, people are often faced with the incompleteness and asymmetry of

knowledge and information. If official information cannot be obtained from mainstream information

channels, all kinds of information will spread rapidly through “informal” channels. In this case, the

spread of information is often untrue, amplified and fast, which is easy to aggravate people’s panic. See

supra note 2.

11 See Yi Lou, “Finance” Cover Article 2: Beijing Archives, http://finance.southcn.com/picture/2

00304210194.htm (accessed on February 11, 2020).

12 See Chuanxin Zhang, The Reason for Spreading Rumor of SARS and Its Revelation, 36(6) Journal of

Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 74, 77 (2003).