Natural law: practical reason and creative information

• Author: John Finnis
• Position: John Finnis, D. Phil., University of Oxford, UK; Biolchini Family Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA; Professor of Law & Legal Philosophy Emeritus, University of Oxford. Contact: jfinnis@nd.edu
• Pages: 373-389

FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA

VOL. 15 DECEMBER 2020 NO. 4

DOI 10.3868/s050-009-020-0022-2

FOCUS

NATURAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD

NATURAL LAW : PRACTICAL REASON AND CREATIVE INFORMATION

John Finnis*

Abstract With nine main theses that are interspersed with each other, this paper

explores and articulates some of the most important questions in natural law theory. The

theses include: I. In investigating facts, one finds reasons to choose an honest

self-discipline; II. Deliberating, one finds reasons similarly directing one to other

intrinsic goods; III. Taken integrally, these goods and principles acquire the force of

moral precepts; IV. Those precepts, natural moral law, depict our nature (humanity) in its

flourishing; V. Nature and natures are best explained by free, intelligent transcendent

creation; VI. Creation and other gifts past and present deserve our gratitude; VII. Natural

moral law and historical revelation are two channels of information; VIII. Secular and

spiritual communities are distinct and respectfully self-governing; IX. Natural moral law

defines human rights but rightfully extends beyond them.

Keywords natural law, practical reason, historical revelation, moral precepts

I. IN INVESTIGATING FACTS, ONE FINDS REASONS TO CHOOSE AN HONEST

SELF-DISCIPLINE ..................................................................................................... 374

II. DELIBERATING, ONE FINDS REASONS SIMILARLY DIRECTING ONE TO OTHER

INTRINSIC GOODS................................................................................................... 375

III. TAKEN INTEGRALLY, THESE GOODS AND PRINCIPLES ACQUIRE THE FORCE OF

MORAL PRECEPTS................................................................................................. 377

IV. THOSE PRECEPTS, NATURAL MORAL LAW, DEPICT OUR NATUR E (HUMANITY)

IN ITS FLOURISHING.............................................................................................. 377

V. NATURE AND NATU RE S ARE BEST EXPLAINED BY FREE, INTELLIGENT

TRANSCENDENT CREATION .................................................................................... 379

VI. CREATION AND OTHER GIFTS PAST AND PRESENT DESERVE OUR GRATITUDE..... 381

VII. NATURAL MORAL LAW AND HISTORICAL REVELATION ARE TWO CHANNELS OF

INFORMATION...................................................................................................... 383

* John Finnis, D. Phil., University of Oxford, UK; Biolchini Family Professor of Law Emeritus,

University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA; Professor of Law & Legal Philosophy Emeritus, University of

Oxford. Contact: jfinnis@nd.edu

374 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 373

VIII. SECULAR AND SPIRITUAL COMMUNITIES ARE DISTINCT AND RESPECTFULLY

SELF-GOVERNING .............................................................................................. 386

IX. NATURAL MORAL LAW DEFINES HUMAN RIGHTS BUT RIGHTFULLY EXTENDS

BEYOND THEM ...................................................................................................... 387

I. IN INVESTIGATING FACTS, ONE FINDS REASONS TO CHOOSE AN HONEST

SELF-DISCIPLINE

Consider questions, that is, questioning, specifically the first experiences we had, each

one of us, of consciously raising questions of fact, and thinking about possible and

available evidence (clues), possible and available answers and explanations. Within that

experience, a further set of questions emerged or emerge, alongside the initial question,

the one that started the investigation. These further questions were or are something like:

What evidence shall I seek, and what shall I ignore and what retain, what shall I treat as

the answer—an answer I want, or that others want me to accept, or only the answer which

the evidence supports as true? For if I am thinking honestly and carefully, trying to attain

a right answer, the truth about the facts that are my initial question’s subject-matter, I

become aware of two elements of my situation.

One element is the constraints or disciplines of honesty or inner sincerity (about what

the evidence is, what really can and cannot be inferred from it), and the demands of

diligence or care in considering it and reasoning about it. Those constraints, disciplines

and demands formulate themselves in my mind as propositions about what I ought and

ought not to do in investigating my question and how to answer it well (honestly and

carefully).

The other element is implicit in those “oughts” and “ought nots.” It is my freedom to

respect them or violate them, deliberately or carelessly. This is a true freedom of choice,

choice between alternative attractive, but incommensurably attractive options: To accept

inadequate answers that are convenient for my prejudices or my popularity, or instead to

carry on searching, if I can, towards answers that, although inconvenient, are (as best I

can judge) true, the best explanation of the evidence; and if I cannot carry on searching,

not to pretend to myself that untrue answers are true. A choice between the sincere and

the insincere, in searching.

Such elements of private experience are among the originating moments in our

awareness of the natural law, and of practical reason, and of what practical reasoning is

about. The activity I was describing was “theoretical” or factual thinking, investigation

of some question of natural science or of history or, later in life, of comparative law or of

philosophy…. Practical reasoning is about deliberating towards free choice between

alternative, incompatible, desirable proposals (options) for my choice—alternative

desirable states of affairs, sets of ends and means, for me to choose between and then put

the chosen option into action to try to achieve the chosen state of affairs. The alternative