On the Composition of the Deputies in the National People's Congress of China

• Author: Zhao Xiaoli
• Pages: 2-27

ZHAO (DO NOT DELETE) 13-10-4 10:16 PM

2012] DEPUTIES IN THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 2

ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE DEPUTIES IN THE

NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF CHINA

ZHAO Xiaoli∗

The composition of the deputies in the National People’s Congress of China shows reliance on

the principle of formal proportionality based on the national census and substantial

representation based on the inclusion of rural areas, minorities and other groups which are a

statistically smaller portion o f the population. However the quota system based on these

principles of representation cannot mitigate against the overrepresentation of government

officials and the increasing elitism of the deputies. Yet these issues are nominal compared to

the forging of closer political bonds between the representatives and the represented. The

author believes that the correlation between the representatives and the represented may be

strengthened by moving towards the direct election of the deputies of the National People’s

Congress, thereby placing the constitutionality of the National People’s Congress as the

highest organ of state sovereignty on a firmer foundation.

On March 14th 2010, the eleventh National People’s Congress

amended the 1979 Electoral Law of the People’s Republic of China

for the National People’s Congress and Local People’s Congresses

for the fifth time, removing the one-quarter clause in favor of

apportioning deputies at the national and local levels based on rural

and urban population.

Under the one-quarter clause prior to the amending of the

Electoral Law, every rural deputy represented four times as many

people as the urban deputy represented. Article 14 and 16 of the

amended Electoral Law states that “t]he number of deputies to the

National People’s Congress shall be allocated by its Standing

Committee on the basis of the population of each province,

autonomous region and municipality directly under the central

government, and in accordance with the principle that each deputy

represents the same number of urban or rural people and the

requirement guaranteeing an appropriate number of deputies for

every region, ethnic group and sector of society”.

This new requirement clarifies two principles for apportioning

deputies for national and local level deputies: firstly, each deputy

represents the same number of urban or rural people, i.e., the

principle of formal proportionality; and secondly, that regions, ethnic

groups or sectors of society with lower population otherwise

incapable of being represented be afforded representation, i.e., the

principle of substantive representation.

It is obvious that the principles of formal proportionality and

substantive representation conflict; if formal proportionality is

applied across the board, then regions, ethnic groups or sectors of

society with lower populations will be denied representation; and if

∗ Associate Professor at School of Law, Tsinghua University.

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2012] DEPUTIES IN THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 3

substantive representation is relied on extensively, then regions with

higher proportions of population will be denied adequate

representation. The author will now first examine the effects of these

two principles on the apportionment of deputies of the National

People’s Congress.

I. APPORTIONMENT OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS DEPUTIES

A. Proportionality and representativeness of rural and urban

deputies

People’s Congress deputies at the county and rural levels are

elected directly, while deputies above the county level are elected

through representatives. Thus the one-quarter clause impacts direct

elections and indirect elections differently.

In direct elections, the one-quarter clause affects the value of each

vote, as the vote of a rural voter is not the same worth as the vote of

an urban voter. The differing value of the votes means that the

deputies voted in by a majority of the population are not necessarily

a majority of the deputies representing the population. For example,

if a county has 1,000,000 residents of which 200,000 are urban

voters and 800,000 are rural, according to the one-quarter clause

there would be the same number of deputies representing the urban

voters as the rural voters. If the county had 300,000 urban voters and

700,000 rural voters, then the deputies representing the urban

population would in fact outnumber the deputies representing the

rural population. The result is that a majority of the deputies do not

represent a majority of the population, which is inconsistent with

formal proportionality.

In indirect elections representative democracy causes the

one-quarter clause to affect not the value of each vote, but the

apportioning of deputies between different voting units. In the

National People’s Congress, apportionment of the deputies is based

on population and the proportion of rural and urban voters in the

provinces, autonomous areas, and the municipalities under the

central government. For example, if province A and municipality B

each have a population of 12,000,000; if province A being an

important agriculture area has a rural population of 9,600,000 and an

urban population of 2,400,000; if the rural population elects one

deputy for every 960,000 people, and the urban population elects one

deputy for every 240,000 1, then province A would have twenty

1 Such a standard has been adopted by the Tenth National People’s Congress and the Eleventh

National People’s Congress to decide the number of deputies elected from each province, autonomous

region or municipality directly under the Central Government. See generally DijiuJie Quanguo Renda

Diwuci Huiyi Guanyu DishiJie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Daibiao Minge He Xuanju Wenti De