The legal infrastructure for creativity in China: a perspective of venture capital

AuthorZhang Lin, AN Jingjing
Position(??) Ph.D. in commercial law, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China; Professor, School of Law, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350117, China; Distinguished Professor, School of Law and Economics, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China. Contact: linzhang@sdut.edu.cn - (???) Corresponding Author, Ph.D....
Pages452-480
FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA
VOL. 15 DECEMBER 2020 NO. 4
DOI 10.3868/s050-009-020-0026-0
ARTICLE
THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CREATIVITY IN CHINA: A PERSPECTIVE OF
VENTURE CAPITAL
ZHANG Lin *, AN Jingjing **
Abstract A new concept of “legal infrastructure” has recently been emerging and
becoming increasingly popular in China. The concept offers a novel analytical
framework to explore China’s existing legal organism for creativity. For this academic
mission, the perspective of venture capital is developed by this article in that it has been
already been convincingly demonstrated by extant studies that venture capital is an
indispensable catalyst for the output level of a country’s creativity. The findings of this
article are that the current legal infrastructure in China impedes the life cycle of venture
capital, to some degree, and in turn impairs the capability of creativity in China’s
economy.
Keywords legal infrastructure, creativity, venture capital (VC), China
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 453
I. GROWTH OF THE CHINESE VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET......................................... 455
II. SUCCESS OF THE AMERICAN VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET .................................... 458
A. Fundraising of American VC............................................................................. 458
B. Incentive Mechanisms of American VC............................................................. 462
C. Exit Channels of American VC .........................................................................464
III. LEGAL HAMPERS FOR CHINESE VENTURE CAPITAL ............................................. 467
A. The Absence of Institutional Investors from Their Real Involvement in the
Chinese VC Market........................................................................................... 467
B. The Underdevelopment of Incentive Mechanisms in the Operation of Domestic
* (张琳) Ph.D. in commercial law, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;
Professor, School of Law, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350117, China; Distinguished Professor, School
of Law and Economics, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China. Contact:
linzhang@sdut.edu.cn
** (安婧婧) Corresponding Author, Ph.D. candidate in international law, School of Law, Korea University,
Seoul, Korea; Lecturer, School of Law, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China. Contact:
anjingjing@sdut.edu.cn
The authors would like to thank Fujian Philosophy and the Social Science Fund (Grant No.
FJ2018MGCA005), Korea University Law Review, Springer, and Elsevier for their financial and intellectual
support for the completion of this research.
2020] THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CREATIVITY IN CHINA 453
Chinese VC ....................................................................................................... 469
1. Limited Partnership...................................................................................... 469
2. Convertible Preferred Stocks........................................................................ 470
3. Stock Options............................................................................................... 472
C. The Exit of Domestic Chinese VC through Domestic Chinese Stock Markets: An
Uneven Road..................................................................................................... 473
1. Main Boards................................................................................................. 473
2. The SME Board............................................................................................ 476
3. The GEM...................................................................................................... 479
4. Reform of the Securities Regulation in China..............................................480
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 480
INTRODUCTION
In 1946, with generous support from Ralph Flanders and MIT President Karl
Compton, General Georges Doriot, a professor of Industrial Management at Harvard
Business School, established the first modern venture capital (VC) firm, American
Research Development Corporation (ARDC), in America.1 The mission of the new firm
was simple but far-reaching: “… aid in the development of new or existing businesses
into companies of stature and importance.”2 During its 26-year existence, ARDC’s most
attractive success resulted from its decision to put up $70,000 to support Kenneth Olsen
and Harlan Anderson’s plan to start up the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). In its
first year, DEC made a small profit by producing Digital Laboratory Modules, but the real
harvest occurred dozens of years later. In 1968, in the wake of DEC’s successful initial
public offering, the value of ARDC’s stake quickly grew to $355 million.3
ARDC was just the beginning of the success story of American VC. In 1978, the U.S.
Department of Labor unbound part of the restrictions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) under the “prudent man rule,” thus allowing pension funds to inject
a tremendous amount of money into American VC firms.4 After that, and until the year
2000, the American VC industry came into its “golden age.” During its booming period,
American VC incubated many current big names including Microsoft, Apple and Lotus,
and paved the path for America being the currently unparallel leader in the global
high-technology market. Even though the bursting of the Internet bubble tainted its image
in 2000, American VC as the “crown jewel” has always been the engine that pushes the
1 Ralph E. Flanders, Senator from Vermont, Little, Brown and Company (Boston), at 188–189 (1961).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Decision to Go Public, 35(3) Journal of
Financial Economics, 293–295 (1994).

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