The Mainland of China's Party Discipline Inspection Commissions: another type of the specialized-anticorruption-commission model?

• Author: DENG Jinting
• Pages: 656-691

FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA

VOL. 11 DECEMBER 2016 NO. 4

DOI 10.3868/s050-005-016-0039-5

ARTICLE

THE MAINLAND OF CHINA’S PARTY DISCIPLINE INSPECTION COMMISSIONS:

ANOTHER TYPE OF THE

SPECIALIZED-ANTICORRUPTION-COMMISSION MODEL?

DENG Jinting *

Abstract Given the comprehensive reforms of and the temporary good scores

achieved by the Commissions of Party Discipline Inspection (CDIs), it is important to

understand these reforms to answer how long this anticorruption movement could last

and whether it could finally succeed. Targeted at the CDIs’ historical problems and the

adapting problems of the specialized-anticorruption-commission model (SAC), this

article is composed of five parts, including: the historical non-specialized mission and

the structural three-transform reform of the CDIs; the historical non-independence of the

CDIs within the dual leadership framework, and its recent reforms; a new understanding

of the sufficiency of the CDIs’ capacity compared with China’s Hong Kong’s ICAC, a

successful example of the SAC, to overcome the distance problem in adapting the SAC;

recent reforms on the accountability and disclosures of the CDIs to overcome the time

consistency problem; and the conclusions for current achievements, with brief

discussions of recent anticorruption strategies and the limitations or unresolved issues,

and the lessons to adapt the SAC.

Keywords anticorruption, party discipline inspection committee, specialized

anticorruption commission

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 657

I. THE HISTORICAL NON-SPECIALIZED-MISSION PROBLEM ....................................... 660

II. THE LACK OF INDEPENDENCE PROBLEM AND RECENT REFORMS.......................... 663

A. The History........................................................................................................ 664

B. Recent Reforms.................................................................................................. 665

* (邓矜婷) S.J.D. Candidate, Indiana Maurer Law School; J.D., Michigan Law School; Assistant Professor,

School of Law, Renmin University of China; Researcher, the Criminal Law Science Study Center of Renmin

University and the Anticorruption and Rule of Law Center, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872,

China. Contact: jintingdeng@126.com

This article is funded by the Social Science Fund of Beijing Youth Project “Research of Venue-Change

System and Criminal Sentence Standard in Beijing’s Corruption Cases,” 15FXC043; The Youth Funds in the

General Research Program of Humanity Social Sciences of China’s Ministry of Education, “Theoretical and

Empirical Research on Deciding the Ratio of China’s Guiding Cases,” 14YJC820011; and the Program for

Young Innovative Research Team in School of Law of Renmin University of China.

2016] THE MAINLAND OF CHINA’S PARTY DISCIPLINE INSPECTION COMMISSIONS 657

1. The Main CDIs ............................................................................................. 665

2. The Dispatched CDI Teams .......................................................................... 667

3. The Circuit Inspection CDI Teams (CITs) .................................................... 669

III. A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE CDI’S CAPACITY AND THE DISTANCE PROBLEM IN

CHINA ................................................................................................................... 674

A. The Staff Strength Comparison.......................................................................... 674

B. The Fund Comparison....................................................................................... 675

C. The Large-Geographical Challenge for the SAC in China ............................... 678

IV. THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE CONSISTENCY PROBLEM..................... 680

A. Independent Oversight Committees................................................................... 682

B. Increased Disclosures........................................................................................ 683

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 686

INTRODUCTION

Since the 18th Plenum of the Communist Party of China (CPC), over a hundred

provincial/ministerial level cadres (tigers) and thousands of city level cadres have been

investigated and removed from positions for corruption, including ZHOU Yongkang, a

previous Standing Committee member of the Politburo; XU Caihou, the previous Vice

Chairman of the Central Military Commission; and SU Rong, the previous Vice

Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference. This is quite astonishing as, from 2009 to 2012, the number of tigers caught

was eight, six, seven, and five respectively.1 Given the weak, routine anticorruption and

the frequent, lenient anticorruption campaigns, with weak anticorruption agencies, how

could this happen, and how long could this last? It seems the new leadership may have

sincere commitment to combating corruption, as indicated in the three Decisions of the

Plenums of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the two Reports of the Plenums of the 18th

Central Commission of Party Discipline Inspection (CCDI), and several speeches by

political leaders, especially President XI and the CCDI Secretary WANG. It was also the

first time that rule of law was the topic for the on-going Fourth Plenum of the 18th CPC

Central Committee. But even with strong political will, previous research has shown that

the institutional and structural weakness of China’s anticorruption agencies and socially

and economically rooted causes for corruption exist in China.2 General study of

corruption has already shown us that strong political will is insufficient to achieve

1 Roundtable before the Congressional-executive commission on China, Corruption in China Today:

Consequences for Governance, Human Rights and Commercial Rule of Law, First Session, 113th Congress,

Nov. 21, 2013, at 27.

2 Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong

Kong, Harvard University Press (Cambridge), (2004).

658 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 11: 656

anticorruption success.3 It needs comprehensive strategy and structural reforms. Even if

China’s recent measures have achieved temporary success, it cannot last long without

deep reforms. To find the answers, this article studies recent structural and institutional

reforms in China’s main anticorruption agencies, the CDIs.

In recognition of the success of the specialized anticorruption commissions of both

Singapore and Hong Kong of China, there has been widespread establishment in corrupt

countries or regions of specialized anticorruption commissions, which formed a SAC

model. Now, there are different models of such agencies.4 However, when adapting this

model in other countries or regions, many failed due to problems in adapting such models

for different situations, especially those with vast geographies, significant rural areas, and

insufficient economic resources.5 With recent reforms, China is trying to build the CDIs

into more specialized anticorruption agencies. To do so, it has to overcome both its own

historical problems and adaptation problems. This article researches recent reforms to

analyze their influences on these problems.

There are already many good articles concerning China’s corruption, including: “How

the Corruption Is Defined, Produced, or Caused in China”;6 “What Consequences Are or

3 Jon S.T. Quah, Controlling Corruption in City-States: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong and

Singapore, 22 Crime, Law & Social Change, 391−414 (1955).

4 John R. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption?,

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, 2004; Nicholas Charron,

Mapping and Measuring the Impact of Anti-Corruption Agencies: A New Database for 18 Countries,

prepared for the New Public Management and the Quality of Government Conference, Nov. 13−15, 2008,

Sweden.

5 Antonio G. David, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Tailoring Cambodia’s Anticorruption Strategy, 45 GWILR

815, 815−846 (2013); Bertrand De Speville, Anticorruption Commissions: The “Hong Kong Model”

Revisited, 17 Asia-Pacific Review 1, 47−71 (2010); Quah, fn. 3.

6 Kilko Ko & WENG Cuifen, Critical Review of Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Corruption: A

Formal-Legal Perspective, 20 Journal of Contemporary China, 359−378 (2011); LI Ling, Corruption in

China’s Courts, in Randall Peerenboom eds. Judicial Independence In China: Lessons For Global Rule Of

Law Promotion, Cambridge University Press (New York), at 196−220 (2010); LI Ling, Performing Bribery in

China: Guanxi-Practice, Corruption with a Human Face, 20 Journal of Contemporary China 68, 1−20 (2011);

HE Xin, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in a Chinese Court, 46 Law &

Society Review, 681−712 (2012); ZHU Jiangnan & WU Yiping, Who Pays More “Tributes” to the

Government? Sectoral Corruption of China’s Private Enterprises, 61 Crime, Law and Social Change,

309−333 (2014); GONG Ting & Alfred M. WU, Does Increased Civil Service Pay Deter Corruption?

Evidence from China, 32 Review of Public Personnel Administration, 192 (2012); Andrew Wedeman, Double

Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China, Cornell University Press (Ithaca), (2012); Jose

Atilano Pena Lopez & Jose Manuel Sanchez Santos, Does Corruption Have Social Roots? The Role of

Culture and Social Capital, 122 J. Bus. Ethics, 697−708 (2014); GONG Ting, Corruption and Reform in

China: An Analysis of Unintended Consequences, 19 Crime, Law and Social Change, 311−327 (1993).