The Legal Philosophy of Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Neo-Confucianism's Possible Contributions to Modern Chinese Legal Reform

• Author: Norman P. Ho
• Pages: 168-214

HO 167 (DO NOT DELETE) 2011-9-2 2:22 PM

168 TSINGHUA CHINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:167

THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ZHU XI (朱熹) (1130-1200) AND

NEO-CONFUCIANISM’S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO

MODERN CHINESE LEGAL REFORM

Norman P. Ho*

Abstract

A vast literature exists on Zhu Xi’s metaphysical and political philosophy; however, his status

and views as a legal thinker have not garnered much scholarly attention. Most broadly, this

Article argues that Zhu Xi made important contributions to the development of Chinese legal

philosophy – by intertwining law closely with both morality and his metaphysical views on li

(principle), Zhu Xi further empowered law and elevated its importance in Chinese society.

This Article will first lay out and analyze Zhu Xi’s legal philosophy (focusing especially on his

view on punishments), situating it within his broader metaphysical philosophy. Then, Zhu

Xi’s legal thought in practice, particularly his views on some cases during his time and also

his career as a local official, will be examined. Attention will also be given to his community

compacts, which the paper argues should be viewed as quasi-legal institutions that

supplemented and buttressed the formal legal system. Through this discussion of Zhu Xi’s

legal thought in practice, this Article hopes to show that there was consistency between Zhu

Xi’s legal philosophy in both theory and practice. Finally, this Article will briefly argue for

the relevance of Zhu Xi’s legal thought today in China’s program of legal reform.

Ultimately, Zhu Xi can be viewed as a model legal thinker for China who offered a complete,

total vision of the place of law in society. Zhu Xi’s views on law challenge continued notions

that Confucianism is incompatible with a modern rule of law system, and also further

emphasizes the deep engagement Neo-Confucians historically wanted to have with actual

policy-making and society.

I. INTRODUCTION

After its violent suppression just a few decades ago in the Cultur-

al Revolution, Confucianism is now making a strong comeback in

China,1 even forming the basis of written decisions in courts of law.

For example, in June of 2010, the Beijing Dongcheng District (东城

区) Court rendered a final decision on a contract dispute case.2 The

* U.S.-Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law. All translations in this Article are

mine, unless otherwise noted. I would like to thank Professors Jerome A. Cohen (New York Universi-

ty) and Benjamin van Rooij (University of Amsterdam) for their helpful comments. I am also grateful

to Professors Peter K. Bol (Harvard University), Tu Weiming (杜维明) (Harvard & Peking Universi-

ties), and Ding Yichuan (丁一川) (Peking University) who were among my first teachers of Chinese

history and who have remained close mentors. (permanent email contact: nho@post.harvard.edu).

1 For a discussion on the rising interest in and influence of Confucianism in modern-day China,

see Norman P. Ho, Unlikely Bedfellows? Confucius, the CCP, and the Resurgence of Guoxue, HARV.

INT’L REV., Summer 2009, at 28-31.

2 For full details of the case discussed here, see Bai Long (白龙), Beijing Dongcheng Qu Fayuan:

Xiaojing Ru Panjue Changshi Yin Reyi (

北京东城区法院：《孝经》入判决

尝试引热议

) [Beijing

Dongcheng District Court: “The Classic of Filial Piety” Invoked in Court Decision, Stirs Debate],

RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [THE PEOPLE’S DAILY], June 10, 2010, available at

HO 167 (DO NOT DELETE) 2011-9-2 2:22 PM

2011] THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ZHU XI 169

court invalidated a property contract between the eighty-five year old

mother and her daughter, ruling that the daughter had clearly and in-

tentionally employed unreasonable methods in order to procure and

transfer her mother’s property to avoid paying back a debt she owed

to her mother.3

The court did not stop there, however. Besides basing its deci-

sion on Chinese contract law, it argued that Chinese traditional val-

ues must be upheld and actively promoted in contemporary society.

The court especially cherished the values of filial piety,4 which re-

quire that children take care of, support, and respect their parents.

The judge quoted directly from an ancient classical Chinese Confu-

cian text, the Xiaojing (孝经), or Classic of Filial Piety,5 to support

his emphasis on these values: “Filial piety is the immutable, constant

rule of Heaven, the full manifestation of righteousness on Earth, and

the sworn duty of all men.”6 The court then argued that filial piety

is one of the most important virtues in Chinese society, and that in

this case the daughter violated the principles of filial piety by disres-

pecting her very old mother. The court reasoned that the daughter’s

unfilial heart and actions not only created a rupture in her relation-

ship with her mother, but also led her to break the law, violate moral

http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/201006/10/t20100610_21500418.shtml. The facts of this case can

be summarized as follows: in August 2008, a Beijing resident named Ms. Zhang signed a contract with

her eighty-five year old mother to transfer the title of a piece of property her mother owned for 370,000

RMB. However, Ms. Zhang never paid, and her mother took her to court. The court ruled that Ms.

Zhang had breached the agreement and had to pay the amount of 370,000 RMB (about 56,000 U.S. dol-

lars) specified in the contract, as well as her mother’s litigation expenses. Yet , the matter was not over

– in October 2009, in the course of filing for enforcement of the verdict by the court, Ms. Zhang’s

mother discovered that her daughter had in fact written another contract in December 2008 and trans-

ferred ownership of the property to her own daughter (surname Tang) for 380,000 RMB. This second

contract in effect prohibited Ms. Zhang from collecting the debt she was owed, as the property was no

longer in her name. Convinced that her daughter and granddaughter had colluded to originally procure

the property at a low price, she again took her daughter to court, requesting that the court nullify the

second contract.

3 Is it Appropriate to Quote Classic Works in Court?, BEIJING REV. (July 22, 2010),

http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2010-07/23/content_286577.htm.

4 The Chinese character for filial piety is xiao (孝). In modern Chinese and speech, the com-

pound xiaoshun (孝顺) is used; the first character, xiao (孝), basically means one must take care of and

support his parents. The second character, shun 顺, exhorts the child to listen to and respect his par-

ents’ wishes and not rebel against them.

5 The Xiaojing (孝经), or Classic of Filial Piety, is a classic Confucian text that discusses how

one can practice the virtue of filial piety in one’s life (such as how to act toward seniors, such as parents

and rulers). The text is structured largely as a series of conversations between Confucius and his dis-

ciple, Zengzi. Authorship was traditionally attributed to Zengzi or Confucius, but the text most likely

dates from in between the Qin and Han dynasties. For a scholarly overview of the Classic of Filial

Piety and its textual history, see William G. Boltz, Hsiao ching (孝经) [The Classic of Filial Piety], in

EARLY CHINESE TEXTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE 141-153 (Michael Loewe ed., 1993).

6 This sentence is a quote from the XIAOJING (孝经) [CLASSIC OF FILIAL PIETY] 30 (Wang Shou-

kuan (汪受宽), ed., Shanghai Guji Chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1998).

HO 167 (DO NOT DELETE) 2011-9-2 2:22 PM

170 TSINGHUA CHINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:167

principles, and disrupt social harmony.7 As we can see, the court

relied on traditional Confucian moral principles in its decision, al-

most treating the Classic of Filial Piety as a supplemental source of

written law.8

Yet, despite this prominent example of the integration of Confu-

cianism into modern Chinese jurisprudence, the historical treatment

of Confucianism and its impact on the development of Chinese law

continues to be unkind and stereotypical; the story of Chinese legal

history continues to maintain that China lacked a rule of law system

in its pre-modern past; Confucianism is generalized as a system of

thought antithetical to law. This existing and unfortunately still-

pervasive narrative of Chinese legal history in much of Chinese and

English scholarship9 has been nicely summarized by two scholars as

follows:

In the standard view widely held by Chinese and others, China

lacked the rule of law throughout its long history for many rea-

sons. First, the dominant intellectual tradition of China was

“Confucianism” . . . that valued the rule by men . . . [D]uring

the Han [dynasty], Chinese emperors ruled by will or whim

over a hierarchical society. That “imperial society” subse-

quently grew in size and sophistication over two millennia

without significant change . . . [O]nly with the decline of Chi-

na’s last dynasty, the Qing (1644-1911 CE), and the arrival of

7 Bai Long, supra note 2.

8 This case sparked a wide range of responses by Chinese commentators. Some, like Sun Wu-

fan, writing on the popular Chinese website sina.com, argued that there was no place for morality in a

written legal ruling: “Obviously, the Classic of Filial Piety does not fall in the category of laws and

rules, hence reference to the ancient literature does not comply with [the] basic rule of making judicial

judgments. . . . The court could choose to educate or persuade the defendant [on moral standards], but

that element should not be included in a ruling.” Is it Appropriate to Quote Classic Works in Court?,

supra note 3. Others were more supportive; Yu Xiangrong of the West China City Daily argued that

“[l]aw and morality do not contradict each other, but are interrelated instead. Laws provide the most

basic requirement of conduct, and are compulsory, while morality is of a much higher standard than the

law. . . . [a] good court ruling should not only make a legal judgment, but also point out the right moral

standards and express the judge’s stance so as to enhance persuasiveness . . . .” Is it Appropriate to

Quote Classic Work s in Court?, supra note 3.

9 For representative works that advance this narrative, see, e.g., STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A

CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 15-16 (2000); JOHN W. HEAD & YANPING WANG, LAW

CODES IN DYNASTIC CHINA 39 (2005); GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL

CHINESE LAW 11 (1996); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 32-

33 (2002); XUE MEIQING (薛梅卿), XINBIAN ZHONGGUO FAZHI SHI JIAOCHENG (新编中国法制史 教

程) [CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY: A TEXTBOOK] 43 (1995). Scholarship on contemporary Chinese legal

reform also dangerously continue such generalizations when attempting to draw a sharp divide between

traditional and modern China, see, e.g., Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit

of a Culture of Law and a Mission of Social Justice, 8 YALE H.R. & DEV. L. J. 117, 121 (2005) (genera-

lizing that “for thousands of years, the Chinese lived not under the rule of law but under the rule of

man”).